20 KVD 25
Translated by Toro Andersen and Google Translate from the original German documents.
Published under Creative Commons license "CC-BY-NC-ND 3.0 DE"
Original document here
The high-performance diesel engine 20 KVD 25
A contribution to the history of diesel engine construction and the navy of the GDR.
By Günter Stavorinus and Werner Neundorf.
Selbstverlag der Autoren
© 2003
TM Digitalkopie und Einband:
Kopierservice Schmidt
WasbekerStr. 11-13
24534 Neumünster
Prefaces
Foreword by Dipl.-Ing. Norbert Krümmling, division manager at WTZ Rosslau.
There is now a very extensive literature on the history of technical developments in the former GDR, and the question arises as to what contribution this report can make to it. As the distance to the existence of two German states increases, it is possible to obtain information from formerly secret archives - both from industry and from the armed forces - which shows that technical developments were already being carried out at a very high level in the early 1950s. Of course, this article, with its detailed research into the history of a high-performance diesel engine for propelling fast naval boats, is a treat for enthusiasts in this field.
But he also truthfully reflects the problems of building a post-war economy with all its facets and decisions that are difficult to understand today. All of this was only possible because both authors joined forces at the right time.
This meant that there was a chance to speak to contemporary witnesses of this very secret but still eventful time and thus to find out things that are neither noted in reports nor in any reports. Gratefully, many people who had a large part, directly or indirectly, in the development of this engine were also mentioned, which represents a certain respect for their achievements. May this report be a valuable addition for friends of special diesel engine construction and for those interested in the technical history of their home country.
Instead of a foreword, comments from a contemporary witness.
From Captain z. See a.D. Dipl.-Ing. Gerhard Vandreier, Head of the Naval Technical Service until 1989 and Deputy Chief of Technology and Weapons in the People's Navy Command until September 1990.
The history of technology always reflects social history. In this study, the authors succeeded in excavating, analyzing and preserving a piece of the GDR's technological history.
It is pleasant to read that the experimental replica of the Daimler-Benz MB 511 marine diesel engine, which was fraught with many problems, was presented without pointing fingers.
The replica of this high-performance engine under the GDR designation 20 KVD 25 was of strategic importance in the 1950s for building the most efficient industry possible. The immediate goal was to cover the need for propulsion engines for fast naval vehicles.
Even from today's perspective, the enthusiasm with which those involved went about solving this complicated task is impressive. There were neither construction documents nor the necessary number of skilled workers. There was also a lack of qualified suppliers.
The test runs that began after assembly revealed a huge number of technical problems, both with the rebuilt machine elements, as well as with other engine parts and even the lubricating oil.
Continuity in development and testing was made additionally difficult by the frequent changes in management bodies or their structural changes. The events of June 17, 1953 had a significant impact. The authors succeeded in making the complicated structures of the GDR economy transparent in this area. They also point out the various difficulties that the development group had to overcome during the reconstruction of the individual parts and the production of the engine.
Thorough research allows us to conclude that at the time the order was canceled, the essential technical problems had been solved on both the engines and the “Forelle 0” boat hull intended for testing.
Towards the end of 1951, a replica of the 2500 hp Daimler-Benz high-performance diesel engine MB 511 was prepared in the GDR under the type designation 20 KVD 25.
The engine was intended to power fast ships and boats for the newly established naval forces. Their mission was to defend the coast of the GDR and its outskirts. Involved in military planning and as allies of the Soviet Union, they were also tasked with providing a limited offensive potential in the western Baltic Sea. Despite all the changes brought about by advances in military technology, little changed in this concept until the dissolution of the People's Navy in 1990. The formation, disguised as a police formation, was suggested by the occupying power, represented by the naval department of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD), and implemented from 1949 onwards.
A development team began working in Berlin-Wilhelmsruh at the end of 1949. The new navy was presented to the public in June 1950 with the establishment of the Maritime Police Headquarters (HVS) in the Ministry of the Interior (Mdl). It received its military status as a People's Police Lake in 1952 before being taken over as a branch of the National People's Army (NVA) in 1956.
The first considerations for building the fleet envisaged high-speed torpedo boats (TS boats) of different tonnage, which were to be powered by, among other things, the Daimler-Benz MB 511 engine, which had proven itself in World War II. Because importing was unthinkable under the conditions of the Cold War, dependencies on the West had to be avoided, and no suitable engine was available from the Soviet sphere of influence, the only alternative was to build a replica. Questions of patent law and license protection played no role under the conditions of the occupation regime. However, the extraordinarily high development and cost effort associated with this was completely underestimated.
Until then, high-performance diesel engines for ship propulsion had only been built in Germany by the renowned companies Maybach Motorenbau and Daimler-Benz, whose production facilities were in the western occupation zones. Most of the supply industry was also located there. With a few exceptions, the territory of the GDR lacked production sites, the basics of metallurgy and manufacturing techniques as well as the experienced personnel for such an ambitious goal. With the help of the socialist planned economy and the enthusiasm of the development generation, people firmly believed in the success of the project.
The reconstruction program began in 1952. After great efforts, it was discontinued at the end of 1958 at a time when the most important technical problems were about to be solved and pre-series production could have started with little more effort. This means that the opportunity to keep up with developments in high-performance diesel engine construction was missed. For the People's Navy, this meant that from now on it would have to rely on imports from the Soviet Union, the purchase, operation and repair of which required a lot of effort and created new dependencies.
The 20 KVD 25 has been described in publications on regional, naval and technological history, but its origins have only been touched upon. The opening of the GDR's archives and the fortunate fact that the technical archive of the Scientific and Technical Center (WTZ) for diesel engines in Roßlau was saved over the fall of communism encouraged the authors to write down the history of the 20 KVD 25. It should not be forgotten that between 1952 and 1959 this engine was at the center of the working lives of many people in Roßlau, Ludwigsfelde and other places in the GDR, whose performance under adverse circumstances deserves respect.
In the first part of the article we will present the most important technical data of the 20 KVD 25 and then in a short description we will introduce the torpedo speedboat “Forelle 0” from the VEB Roßlau shipyard, where the engine was tested in practice. In one The second part examines the 20 KVD 25 as a product of the GDR's armaments industry and describes the connection between political guidelines, plans and their implementation, because many decisions remain incomprehensible to the reader without knowledge of the special structures and management levels of this industry.
The main part reports on the most important design and development offices, mechanical engineering companies and supplier companies involved in the repair of the original engines, the reproduction and the zero-series production. The efforts made in connection with the production of problem components were examined particularly thoroughly. This part concludes with the presentation of the test results on land and at sea.
A summary, the building description and parts of the operating instructions, lists of sources and literature as well as a register of people, together with the acknowledgments, form the conclusion.
Günter Stavorinus wrote the general and armaments economics section, Werner Neundorf the engine technology section of the essay.
It is clear to the authors that many questions remain unanswered in connection with the history of the 20 KVD 25. Therefore, they accept any comments and additions with thanks.
Trappenkamp/Holstein Roßlau/Elbe
Günter Stavorinus Werner Neundorf
1. The ship diesel engine 20 KVD 25 and the torpedo speedboat "Forelle 0"
The GDR replica of the Daimler-Benz speedboat engine MB 511 under the type designation 20 KVD 25 comes from a series of developments that began with demands for a drive with high performance and operational reliability for airships.
Modified engines with these characteristics were suitable for use on speedboats of the Reich and Kriegsmarine. Their development and production was therefore co-financed by the Navy's design office. At the outbreak of war, the 20-cylinder V-engine MB 501, ready for series production, was available as a naturally aspirated engine with 2000 hp and from 1943 the mechanically supercharged MB 511 with an output of 2500 hp. The latter became the standard engine for the Kriegsmarine's S-boats. The further developed MB 518 with 3000 hp no longer made it to the front. (1)
| Engine characteristics: | |
|---|---|
| Model | 20 KVD 25 |
| Working principle | 4 stroke |
| Cylinder arangement | Standing V form |
| Number of cylinders | 20 |
| Bore | 185 |
| Stroke | 250 |
| Displacement per cylinder | 6,72 Liter |
| Compresion | 14:1 |
| Weight dry | 4550 Kg dry without extra equipment |
| Type of charging | Centrifugal blower, mechanically driven |
| Lubrication | Pressure circulation and spray oil lubrication |
| Cooling | Fresh water with seawater recooling |
| Regulator | Centrifugal |
| Direction of rotation | Depending on the version left or right, directly reversible |
| Reduction gear | 1,72:1 |
| Full length without intermediate shaft | 4025 mm |
| Width including exhaust collector | 1670 mm |
| Height including intercooler | 2265 mm |
| Engine speed | Power | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Continous power | 1480 | 1875 | 180 | 5 - 6 |
| Increased continuous performance (max. 3 hours) | 1530 | 2060 | 185 | 7 - 8 |
| Overperformance* | 1580 | 2250 | 190 | 9 - 10 |
* Maximum useful power that the engine can deliver for a total of 1 hour within a 6-hour period (continuous or interrupted).
The 20 KVD 25 was only used in the torpedo speedboat “Forelle 0”. For reasons of In camouflage, this vehicle was also referred to as a "fast cruising yacht, small", "M 5" or "F 5". In the maritime police, a planing boat was preferred over a displacement boat.
VEB Schiffswerft Roßlau received the construction contract in 1952. This company belonged to the Sachsenberg brothers until 1945 and made a name for itself by building fast hydrofoils based on the Schertel system for the Navy. The Soviet occupying power had ordered the continued construction of captured hydrofoils and a special design office had been set up for this purpose, which only ceased its activities in 1948/49 when it was integrated into the Central State Design Office for Shipbuilding in Berlin-Köpenick. After expropriation and partial dismantling, the shipyard became state property in 1949 and was commissioned to make reparations for the Soviet Union.
From the war economy, it had a qualified workforce and a shipyard hierarchy with competent management members. The staff received an innovative boost by taking on skilled workers from Junkers aircraft company.
Under the leadership of the young and imaginative shipbuilding engineer Hans Reinecke, a research and development group for planing and hydrofoil boats was formed in 1952. Because tow channels for fast watercraft were not available in the GDR, model boats were built and tested extensively on Lake Müritz. Soviet experts also occasionally attended these test drives. The boat M 2 a with a stern step showed the most favorable results and provided the template for the construction work on the “Forelle 0”. (3) Under the technical director Postl, there was the chief designer Braun, the engineers Lauterbach (shipbuilding), Wieners (lightweight construction) and Bauer (mechanical engineering) was involved in the design. The shipbuilding planning of the VP-See envisaged a series of 24 boats of this type. Of these, 4 were also intended for the "long coastal voyage" up to 61 degrees north, i.e for the area of the transition from the North Sea to the Norwegian Sea. (4)
For the construction of a first batch originally comprising 6 boats, later reduced to 3, a special hall was set up at the shipyard, with Obermeister Fräsdorf supervising.
According to the information sheet for the "Forelle" object from the Office of Technology, the ship's hull, riveted from AI Mg 4 and 5, was 27.25 m long, had a maximum width of 7.16 m and was a maximum of 3.08 m high. The displacement was included 67.25 t was calculated. With two diesel engines of 2500 hp each, the two-screw boat was supposed to reach a speed of 22 meters per second, i.e. 42.76 knots, in calm and deep water. The cruising range was set at 480 nautical miles.
Use in coastal waters and in the open sea had to be guaranteed up to sea level 6. Two torpedo tubes on the upper deck and light machine cannons were provided as armament.
The crew should consist of an officer and 10 men. The government contract for the speedboat had the number B 5 / 3255 / 084-001 - 006. The construction costs per boat were estimated at four million marks. Construction plans for "Forelle O" have not yet been found. A variant from 1955 , in which the motors should deliver their power to the drive shafts via an angular gear, shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Sketch project of an unrealized drive variant of the “Forelle” from May 1955 with the only general plan available to date.
(Drawing: Heiner Theuerkauf)
The construction progress was followed with great attention by the clients. An unexpected delay occurred due to the Elbe flooding in 1954. At the end of 1955, Minister Stoph inspected "Forelle 0" in Peenemünde, Vice Admiral Verner, the head of the VP-See, was in Roßlau and was met by the head of the shipbuilding department, Captain of the Sea (Ing.) Wachsmann and the responsible staff, Lieutenant-Captain (Ing .) Blücher and First Lieutenant (Ing.) Pagel, report regularly. Soviet naval officers also showed particular interest in the “Forelle 0”.
As expected, the O-Bdot had defects, the shipbuilding part of which could have been solved. It was only the delays in engine development that contributed to the cancellation of the project, although at the end of 1958 the output of 2275 hp required for construction approval was proven, using original engines largely made up of GDR replica parts.
In late autumn 1958, "Forelle 0", under the command of Lieutenant Commander Paul Bendig and with Fritz Krage as test engineer, reached a speed of more than 43 knots during a mile-long journey in the Tromper Wiek. The usefulness of the technical concept was thus proven.
2. The 20 KVD 25 in the GDR's armaments industry
In July 1952, at the 2nd SED party conference, the establishment of socialism in the GDR and its armed protection were decided. (7) German political considerations did not yet allow the formation of a people's army. Therefore, as a compromise, the Barracked People's Police (KVP) was created in 1956 with a force structure and military ranks. The Ministry of the Interior was given a dual function. It was the police and provisional defense ministry with Willi Stoph at the helm.
This fulfilled Soviet demands that had been raised by Stalin in Moscow in April 1952 and clarified by Marshal Chuikov and Ambassador Semyonov in East Berlin at the beginning of July 1952.8 After the failure of the neutralization policy for Germany and against the background of growing tensions in the East -West conflict, the aim was to establish a strong bond between the GDR and the Soviet bloc and to stabilize it internally.
The armament program imposed on the Central Germans in this context required the GDR economy to use a large proportion of the scarce resources that were available due to war damage, dismantling, reparations and occupation burdens as well as because of the disproportions in the industrial structure of divided Germany. The political and social change, a reorganized economy, which was accompanied by the nationalization of industry, a land reform, and the development of a new basic materials and heavy industry in a socialist planned economy, had not yet reached the old pre-war performance and the standard of living of the population stabilized at a modest level.According to official data, with the increased rearmament that began in the early 1950s, 8.4% of the national income was withdrawn in 1952 and 8.2% in 1953. If you add to this the costs for the occupying troops, the reparations, the subsidies for Wismut AG and other Soviet stock corporations (SAG), then in 1952 more than 20% and in 1953 13.2% of the state budget were spent on "special consumption". In 1952 and 1956 an average of 18% per year.(9)
The armament of the navy in the GDR had already begun in 1948 with the planning of patrol boats to secure the maritime border, and with Order No. 086 of the Soviet Military Administration for Germany (SMAD) the provisional central government of the Soviet occupation zone, the German Economic Commission (DWK ), on June 8, 1949, the construction of 20 sea cutters was commissioned according to the designs of the Scientific and Technical Organization (WTO) of the shipbuilding industry. The 28m long, 25 knot fast vehicles, equipped with an anti-submarine component, were to be delivered by the end of 1950. In the absence of a suitable drive, point f) of the order ordered the use of the "existing Ju.Mo./205 aircraft engines" (meaning Jumo 205) as well as the planning and construction of reversing gears for them. (10)
An emergency solution was found with the navalized version of a 600 hp aircraft diesel engine, but it did not solve the propulsion problem for small and fast ships. Since, on the one hand, the establishment of armed forces equipped with the most modern technology was required (decision of the 2nd party conference) and, on the other hand, imports from the West to close gaps in problem components were not possible and these were not available in the Eastern Bloc either, one had to rely on the innovative Cooperation from our own industry and the use of replicas for some products. The engine discussed here is an example of the latter case.
The equipment and supplies of the GDR's military units were subject to the bureaucratic planning and administration process for the entire national economy. It is laid down in the intended ideal form in the "Zeuthen" document for the process of a shipbuilding contract between the Ministry of the Interior, the responsible industry ministries and the VP-See. (11) (Appendix 3, Sheet 48)
However, practice proved far more difficult. The fleet construction program proposed in the "Zeuthen" document for a navy with 314 ships and boats, for which, including the shipyards and suppliers, the amount of 810 million marks would have been necessary for the years 1954 to 1957 alone, had the character of a wish list. ( Appendix 3, sheet 87).
In addition, construction work had begun on a gigantic base for the maritime economy and the navy on the island of Rügen, which would have been associated with high costs. (12).
The largest part of this project failed after the events of June 17, 1953. The second armament phase that began at the end of 1954, with reduced demands, better organized and financially less burdensome due to the SU's waiver of reparations, was also only possible in the GDR's still existing shortage economy partially realized. The shipbuilding industry, which was oriented towards reparations and exports to the Soviet Union, had to fight "logger battles" in favor of this customer and had hardly any free capacity for the Navy's wishes. The first generation of ships and boats for the VP Sea / Naval Forces of the NVA therefore only made around 5 % of the new building tonnage produced in the GDR.
The implementation of the naval shipbuilding program also suffered from the fact that, due to the conflict between maintaining power and an efficient economy, the key industries were the subject of economic policy experiments and restructuring due to party intervention. The result of this was that between 1951 and 1958 the mechanical engineering ministry had changing responsibilities and used three ministers to manage it, two of whom died by suicide. The shipbuilding industry, which is subordinate here, also saw changing responsibilities during this time. (13) In the main shipbuilding administration of the ministry, senior engineer Werner Klewitz and the employees of a "special department" represented the office for economic issues. A certain continuity was only maintained in the person of State Secretary Emst Wolf, who was involved in armaments management for almost the entire period of interest here Responsibility remained.
The Navy and its predecessors, as the recipients, had to coordinate their projects and claims with the Soviet control authorities, defend them before the party and government authorities and ensure that they were included in the annual economic plans. The disadvantage was that the naval leadership was not constantly staffed and the staff was affected by frequent changes of location. In addition, from August 1953 the naval chief had lost his independence by being subordinate to the head of the KVP and his management body. From 1950 to 1959, three officers took over the management of the shipbuilding department in the Navy staff, and in the Ministry of the Interior/Ministry of National Defense the responsibilities of a deputy minister for planning and procurement, technology and coordination also changed several times. Continuous development work was difficult to achieve under these circumstances.
The flight of the long-time head of the shipbuilding department in the ministry's planning and procurement administration, Paul Fink, to West Germany also caused a stir. (14)
Until 1950, the so-called "Stoph apparatus" or the "Stoph office" was sufficient to implement the material demands of the GDR's armed organs, but the changed situation after the 2nd party conference required an armaments office with extensive powers. From 1952 onwards, the “Office for Economic Affairs” (BfW), which was founded in 1951 and initially reported to the Prime Minister, was given greater powers. Willi Stoph led it confidently in a dual role as Economic Secretary at the SED Central Committee and Deputy Prime Minister. His successor, Major General Bernd Weinberger, appointed in 1952, lost Rank and position in October 1953 "because of political concessions" to the strikers at the Warnow shipyard in Warnemünde during the unrest in June 1953.(15)
As part of the preparations for the establishment of the National People's Army, the Office for Technology (AfT) under Emst Wolf was responsible for managing the armaments industry in September 1955. Conceived as an independent state secretariat, it increasingly came under the influence of Willi Stoph as the determining authority. However, this management scheme was abandoned again in May 1958 when the GDR economy was restructured again. The Office for Technology was dissolved and its tasks with reduced production capacities were transferred to the Association of State-Owned Enterprises Universal Machine Construction (VVB UNIMAK). She also only had arms management responsibility until December 1961, because after that this task was transferred to a deputy of the Minister for National Defense as "Chief of Economics", later "Chief of Technology and Armaments".
The military played an ambivalent role in the Office for Economic Affairs, the Office for Technology and in the VVB UNIMAK. They were dominant in the BfW until 1955, less influential in the AfT and gained considerable influence in the VVB UNIMAK. However, a hard core of top performers survived every change and later occupied key defense positions in the main departments (later areas) I of the state planning commission, the finance, foreign trade and industry ministries.
The number of companies and facilities directly subordinate to the armaments offices changed. There was never a “military-industrial complex” in the GDR, but there were “armament islands,” which included military shipbuilding.
Orders for the armed forces, first referred to as "special production", then summarized under the term "special production", were able to be carried out with the help of government orders and the later issued supply regulations (regulations on services and deliveries to the armed organs, known as "LVO"). can also be enforced against the resistance of individual ministries or companies.
There was no public institution to control military spending. Willi Stoph, who constantly expanded his position of power, had already expressed his opinion in a letter to the then head of the Training Headquarters (HVA), Heinz Hoffmann, at the beginning of August 1951. For him it was clear, particularly for reasons of secrecy, that "neither the Ministry of Financial Affairs nor any other departments are authorized to carry out controls on the use of the funds managed by my office."16 The control of investments by the German Investment Bank and the However, he was unable to prevent transactions involving exports and imports.
The organization of the GDR's arms industry underwent several changes after 1961, demonstrating the conflict of interests between business and the military and only finding a satisfactory solution late. Greater attention was paid to problems of military economics, experts in the Soviet Union, at the Military Political University of the NVA, the Military Academy "Friedrich Engels" and at the officers' colleges of the NVA for military-specific matters, as well as at the University of Economics in Berlin-Karlshorst for macroeconomic classification This sector of the economy is trained. Details cannot be presented here. (17)
In the years crucial for the reproduction of the Daimler-Benz MB 511 speedboat engine, the Office for Technology (AfT) was the government agency in charge of the economy. Its mission was to "ensure a fundamental improvement in planning, an increase in production and an increase in quality in the defined specialist areas and to ensure better utilization of all existing opportunities for research and development." (18)
The AfT had the tasks of a ministry of industry, but with a structure in which the then usual second management level of the "Association of State-Owned Enterprises" (W B) was dispensed with. The employees were civilian employees. For those from the military apparatus of the administration planning and procurement of the Reserve officer status was introduced for the specialists taken over by the Ministry of the Interior, around 25%.
Administration VI was responsible for naval shipbuilding. It was headed by a naval architect from the former Economic Affairs Office. In addition to two shipyards and a foundry from VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde, it was responsible for the Institute for Engine Construction (IfM) in Roßlau/Ludwigsfelde, which emerged from the Roßlau design and development office, and the Institute for Shipbuilding Technology Wolgast (ISW) with branches in Roßlau and Dresden. Details are shown in the attached structural sketch in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Structure of administration VI in the Office of Technology (September 1, 1955 - April 30, 1956)
In 1956, Administration VI employed a total of 3,740 wage and salary earners in its operations. It was also responsible for scientific and technical cooperation with the Military Shipbuilding Section in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). From the GDR side, this committee included a state secretary from the Ministry of Heavy Engineering, the head of the naval forces, his deputy for technology and armament, the director of the Institute for Shipbuilding Technology and the technical head of Administration VI as secretary. The engine industry was not represented. (19)
Because in practice it soon became clear that in many of the companies under the AfT's control, more products were produced for commercial than for military use, and therefore cooperation with other sectors of the economy became increasingly necessary, the AfT was reorganized in May 1956. Ship and engine construction were combined with the repair works for the army in Headquarters III under Huldreich Stroh. The competencies of the former Administration VI were little affected by this. Because no satisfactory level of arms management was found to meet the material demands of the armed forces, and expensive armaments projects were abandoned in favor of imports from the Soviet Union in order to soon bring the NVA into the Warsaw Treaty as a full member, the law of February 11th In 1958, in order to perfect and simplify the state apparatus, the AfT was also dissolved and its tasks were transferred to VVB UNIMAK.
The VVB UNIMAK, which existed from May 1958 to December 1961, again with a military as main director, was the last armaments authority in charge of the economy in connection with the replica of the MB 511 as 20 KVD 25. With the exception of the VEB Peenewerft Wolgast and the VEB Industriewerk Dessau, which is currently under construction and intended to replace the VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde, which was handed over to the aviation industry as "Plant 807", all other companies from the former administration VI were incorporated into civil economic sectors, the Institute for Shipbuilding Technology in Wolgast was assigned to the Navy.
After appropriate party and government resolutions, the VVB UNIMAK finally made the decision in November 1958 to finally abandon the replica of the MB 511 in favor of imports from the Soviet Union. (20)
Additional funds should no longer be raised for investments in the supply industry to build a speedboat weapon. With the takeover of the first nine TS boats of the Soviet Project 183 in October 1957, the Navy drew conclusions from the delay in the "Trout" procurement program and was able to use these "shock forces" in a tactical exercise in July 1958 as part of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. (21)
3. The development and manufacturing companies for the 20 KVD 25
3.1. The design and development office (KEB) Roßlau and the Institute for Engine Construction Roßlau - Ludwigsfelde - Dessau (IfM)
At the beginning of October 1950, at the VEB Elbe-Werk Roßlau, the former apparatus and machine factory of the Sachsenberg brothers, a small number of engine construction specialists at the Junkers works were brought together in a "group design office". This institution served to concentrate engineering expertise and the Reintegration of those specialists who had been brought to the SU in a night and fog operation in 1946 and who had helped to build up the aviation industry there. Their migration to the West was to be prevented under favorable working conditions. (22)
For the Association of State-Owned Energy and Power Machinery Companies (VVB EKM) Construction and Development Plant in Halle / Saale, technical documents saved at the end of the war were to be prepared for the production of simple diesel engines and low-power steam engines. The 10 hp engine 1NVD14, a Deutz copy, which was later produced in the Aken branch plant, was one of them.
The group design office was housed in rooms above the gate entrance to the old main factory at Hauptstrasse 117/119 (Fig.5)
Fig. 5. Administrative building of the Elbe-Werk Roßlau in Hauptstr. 117/119 (Photo: W. Neundorf, June 2002)
Fig. 6. Senior engineer Kurt Böhme, chief designer of KEB Roßlau (Photo: Archive WTZ Roßlau)
Kurt Böhme took over the management. (Fig. 6) He received the title of senior engineer in 1951 and was awarded the title of “Deserved Technician of the People” in 1953 and the “Medal for Loyal Service in the Barracked People's Police” in 1955.
Böhme was born on February 12, 1911, attended the Higher Mechanical Engineering School in Leipzig from 1929 to 1932 and worked in diesel aircraft engine production at the Junkers factory in Dessau from 1934 to 1945. From 1945 to 1948 he was in custody in the Soviet "special camps for Hitler activists" Mühlberg, Torgau and Buchenwald. He shared this life experience with the first director of the shipbuilding design office of the Maritime Police / VP-See, senior engineer Walter Schlaak. (23) After 1948 After his dismissal, Böhme was employed in Dessau and then at the Aken diesel engine factory, where he supervised the reconstruction of the Junkers opposed piston engine HK 65 until his appointment to the KEB Roßlau.
The chief designer is described by his employees as a talented organizer who placed high demands on his employees. His particular strength lay in his ability to come to terms with the GDR's power apparatus in such a way that he found trust and sufficient support for his work for a long time.
After the group design office gradually moved on to new designs and standardization projects and set up a testing group, the workforce, which had now increased from 36 to 136 employees, demanded more space. This was found at Karl-Liebknecht-Straße 38 at the beginning of 1952 on the site of a former paper factory, later used as an apprentice workshop by the Sachsenberg brothers and used by the city administration. The group design office now became the design and development office for diesel engines and steam engines (KEB) Roßlau. (Fig. 7). It remained subordinate to the VVB EKM in Halle. The production of test samples and the test stand remained in the Elbewerk, with the Rossel river supplying the cooling and brake water for the latter.
Fig. 7. Main building of the KEB Roßlau on Karl-Liebknecht-Str. 38 (Photo: Archive WTZ Roßlau)
The move was also forced because the concentration of engine construction specialists from the Dessau area in Roßlau was intended to create an efficient development company for the GDR's slowly emerging arms industry. For this purpose, funds from the “Project M special investment project” were made available by the Ministry of the Interior. This relocation was originally only intended as a temporary solution until space was created for 100 designers and the corresponding support staff in rooms above the assembly hall of the Elbe factory.
In Roßlau, engine-technical investigations had already been carried out on a technology for the production of spare parts for the Maritime Police's Jumo 205 engines and preparatory work for the replica of the MWM diesel engine RS 143 S as 6 KVD 43 at the VEB diesel engine plant in Rostock. This engine was used as the main drive for the mine-laying and clearing ships of the “Habicht” and “Krake” types and on auxiliary ships of the Maritime Police and VP-See. Jumo spare parts production and the replica of the MB 511 were given equal importance. In addition, the 6 KVD 25, a 600 hp engine, was to be developed as a replacement for the Jumo 205 and a variant of the KVD 21, an engine to drive smaller naval vessels. The KVD 21 was later rejected by the Navy and an imported engine from the SU was used in its place.After the 20 KVD 25 was given top priority in the mid-1950s, to fulfill this government order with the number B4/3355/0626, the KEB staff, including the workshop and hall staff in Ludwigsfelde, grew from 250 to more than 600 employees, the entire development team came under the responsibility of the Office of Technology (AfT) from January 1, 1956 as the Institute for Engine Construction (IfM). The influence of the Ministry of National Defense, created in 1956, created new conditions. Kurt Böhme gave up management of the IfM at the end of 1957, but remained its technical director. His successor was Reinhold Wachsmann, who headed the shipbuilding department on the Navy staff from 1951 to the beginning of 1957 as a sea captain (engineer).
When the IfM moved to Ludwigsfelde, which was prepared for 1957, it was intended that marine engine construction would be concentrated at this location. An office building for the IfM and two test benches for several engines were under construction.
However, the relocation from Roßlau to Ludwigsfelde was not carried out because in January 1957 VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde had to fulfill new tasks in the aircraft industry, which was now particularly in demand, as “Plant 807”. The planned project “Construction of a The pilot series of 20 20 KVD 25" engines was therefore transferred to the Institute for Engine Construction.
In a cooperation agreement with VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde, halls 8 and 9 were given to the engine manufacturers for use, and work began on building a new production facility in Dessau for the IfM. Administration and some of the technical staff soon moved into massive barracks that had been built opposite the future production and assembly hall on Kühnauer Strasse.
When the IfM moved to Ludwigsfelde, which was prepared for 1957, it was intended that marine engine construction would be concentrated at this location. An office building for the IfM and two test benches for several engines were under construction.
However, the relocation from Roßlau to Ludwigsfelde was not carried out because in January 1957 VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde had to fulfill new tasks in the now particularly demanding aircraft industry as "Plant 807". The planned project was "Construction of a pilot series of 20 20 KVD 25 engines". therefore transferred to the Institute for Engine Construction.
In a cooperation agreement with VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde, halls 8 and 9 were given to the engine manufacturers for use, and work began on building a new production facility in Dessau for the IfM. Administration and some of the technical staff soon moved into massive barracks that had been built opposite the future production and assembly hall on Kühnauer Strasse.
Because the Ludwigsfeld plant was unable to significantly reduce its workforce for the new Pirna 0 14 jet engine production line, skilled workers had to be recruited in Roßlau and the surrounding area, qualified and assigned to work in Ludwigsfelde. They were accommodated on site in barracks and guesthouses and taken home on weekends by bus.
The following can be reported in this regard: In July 1957, job advertisements appeared in the daily newspaper “Freiheit” in which metal workers were recruited for the IfM, because apparently workers could not be hired through administrative acts even for an important government contract. (Fig. 8) The employment contracts of the Committed applicants resemble the models of the industrial world if you strip them of their political decorations. (Fig. 9) Given the excessive secrecy maintained in the GDR, the obligation of confidentiality required of the new employee is also understandable. (Fig. 10) The isolation of those in the halls 8 and 9 of the Ludwigsfelde plant employees from the rest of the workforce also belonged to this system, as did the inconvenience of accommodation outside of Ludwigsfelde or in residential barracks. (Fig. 11 and 12) The two-shift operation also reduced the attractiveness of the workplace. For them Buses rented by the institute management provided return trips to Dessau and Roßlau on weekends, with initially eight to twelve and later up to 100 employees making the journey. (Fig. 13 and 14)
Fig. 8. Job advertisement from the Roßlau Institute for Engine Construction.
Abb. 9. Arbeitsvertrag mit dem Zusatz betr. die Rückkehr auf einen Arbeitsplatz in Dessau. (Quelle: Privatbesitz)
Abb. 10. Text der Verpflichtung für Mitarbeiter des I M . (Direktor Böhme) (Quelle: Privatbesitz)
Abb. 11 u. 12. Barackenunterkunft in Ludwigsfelde, Potsdamer Straße in der Nähe der Autobahn (Quelle: Privatbesitz)
Abb. 13 u. 14. Vom IfM gestellter Bus für die Wochenendpendler. (Quelle: Privatbesitz)
Career advancement was made possible through qualification opportunities. There were contractually agreed training measures for which a sponsor took responsibility. (Fig. 15) If successful, it resulted in promotion to a higher wage group (Fig. 16).
However, wage increases were also the result of good work performance, even if the person concerned left something to be desired in his “social activities”. (Fig. 17 and 18)
Fig. 15. Contract for qualification as a boring mill operator. (Factory manager Wachsmann) (Source: private property)
Fig. 16. Benachrichtigung über die Lohnerhöhung nach der erfolgreichen Qualifizierung. (Quelle: Privatbesitz)
Fig. 17. Notification of the wage increase after successful qualification. (Source: private property)
Fig. 18. Letterhead VEB Industriewerk Dessau. (Plant manager Amberg) Notification of a wage increase. (Source: private property)
Under these circumstances, it was out of the question to produce the O-series engines on time, especially since it soon became clear that the engine parts taken over in Ludwigsfelde had significant quality defects.
When the decision was made in November 1958 to stop all work on the 20 KVD 25 and to scrap parts and devices, the Institute for Engine Construction was also gradually dissolved until mid-1959. Around 260 employees remained in Roßlau with senior engineer Böhme and formed the Central Development and Construction Diesel Engines (ZEK Dieselmotoren) of VVB Diesel Engines, Pumps and Compressors in Halle.
In the newly founded VEB industrial plant in Dessau, the remaining workforce, under the leadership of engineer Erich Amberg, realized special productions for the NVA. Production included, among other things, compressors, gearboxes, hollow shafts and variable-pitch propellers for the navy. After VVB UNIMAK was dissolved, the company was assigned to VEB Maschinenfabrik und Eisengiesserei Dessau as Plant II. The higher-level body was VEB Gear and Couplings Magdeburg, later VVB ABUS (equipment for mining and heavy engineering).
The large production and assembly hall of this company now serves as the Junkers Museum. (Fig. 19 and 20)
Fig. 19. A Junkers Ju 52 in the former workshop of the VEB Industriewerk Dessau (Photo: Joachim Mattner)
Fig. 20. Portal of the former workshop of the VEB Industriewerk Dessau as a Junkers Museum. (Photo: Joachim Mattner)
It remains to be added that the IfM employees who remained in Roßlau incorporated the experience gained in the 20 KVD 25 program and in other marine-specific orders into new engine generations. From January 1965, the ZEK became the Scientific and Technical Center (WTZ) Diesel engines with expanded tasks in basic research for third-generation diesel engines with outputs of up to 9000 hp. This period is marked by the leadership of Professor Dr. Ing. Rudolf Sperber. After studying engineering, he joined the IfM and was entrusted with special development issues for the 20 KVD 25.
With the transition of the GDR economy to combine structures from 1980 onwards, the names and subordination of the WTZ changed without changing the basic mission.
The engine technology research in Roßlau created the basis for the scientific preliminary phase of the diesel engine programs of the 1980s and initiated scientific cooperation with comparable institutions in several RGW countries.
After the fall of the Wall, the WTZ was run as a corporation under the name SKL Engineering Roßlau GmbH, then transformed into a trust company and finally, with greatly reduced staff, continued in 1994 as WTZ for engine and machine research in the legal form of a non-profit GmbH.
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of its founding in October 2000, a positive balance was drawn and the hope was expressed that engine research in Roßlau will continue to be successfully carried out as a key task of the WTZ.24
3.2. The VEB Elbe-Werk Roßlau
In the original concept for the replica of the MB 511, the VEB Elbe-Werk was intended for the model factory and as an extended workbench for the Ludwigsfeld company. The plant emerged from the Sachsenberg brothers' mechanical and apparatus engineering business. It was spun off from the shipyard, nationalized and placed under the control of the Association of State-Owned Energy and Power Machinery Companies (VVB EKM) in Halle as an independent VEB. The factory supplied steam and auxiliary engines for shipbuilding, a branch in Aken supplied low-power diesel engines and injection devices.
According to government resolutions from February 1952, in which State Secretary Wolf from the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and the technical manager of VVB EKM, Kirsten, were involved, the VEB Elbe-Werk was to take on the tasks of a "development plant for high-speed piston engines in design, production and testing". The preliminary project was completed in March/April 1952 and initially envisaged the construction of three test engines and the production of a pilot series of 10 machines.
Funds were made available from the "Ludwigsfelde Special Fund" to expand the workshops and assembly halls and to modernize the machine tool park. The construction of test benches was considered a priority. The design and development office was to be expanded in terms of personnel and temporarily use rooms at Karl-Liebknecht-Strasse 38 until extensions to the Elbe factory would allow for accommodation. The move to this temporary facility cost around half a million marks.
A total of 7.8 million marks were approved from rearmament funds for construction work, equipment, assembly and transport costs, as well as other expenses, of which around 4.9 million marks had been spent by mid-November 1952.
Despite the high priority that the 20 KVD25 program evidently enjoyed in economic planning, the statement by the Elbe plant's investment group reveals that the project was delayed for "weeks" because there was a lack of means of transport, construction workers and reinforcing bars, and despite contacting the ministry and the State Secretariat for Material Supplies, no "code" for preferential treatment could be obtained. Nor could an "urgency number" be obtained for the machines, tools and other equipment.
The construction of special machines, e.g. for the plate boring machine for machining large engine housings made of an aluminum alloy, was delayed by half a year because the "sample engine was delivered six months later than originally planned." Finally, the test bench could not be put into operation on schedule because the necessary pipes could not be obtained.
In mid-October 1952, the VEB Elbe-Werk was stripped of its contract to become the development and prototype manufacturer for the 20 KVD 25. The management was not given any justification for this decision. With the newly gained capacity, the company was to return to the manufacture of diesel engines, piston steam engines, pumps and electric generators, and these products would determine the "P 1 production", while the construction of five 20 KVD 25 diesel engines worth 4.5 million marks would make up the "P 2 production". (26)
Although the plant manager Valtin and the investment officer Karius pointed out that this unexpected change would lead to an uneconomical use of the new capacities and that the asset value/production value ratio would be negatively affected, this did not lead to a change in the decision.
On November 15, 1952, talks about cooperation took place at VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde to take over the external orders. The Elbe plant in Roßlau was to machine the engine housings and pistons for the production of 5 test engines, and the Aken plant was to produce the injection pumps, nozzle holders and nozzles.
In 1954, due to deadline constraints in the 20 KVD 25 program, consideration was again given to including the Elbe plant in engine production because the Ministry of the Interior had revived the old plan of requiring 3 test engines and 10 engines of a 0 series. This attempt was also unsuccessful, so that the company was finally involved in the diesel engine program for rail vehicles with the VEB Dieselmotorenwerk in Leipzig and the VEB Motorenwerk in Berlin-Johannisthal, so that the investments could be put to other useful uses. (27)
3.3. The VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde (IWL)
At the beginning of the 1950s, SED officials from Ludwigsfelde approached the Central Committee of the party with the proposal to reuse part of the 390 hectare former Daimler-Benz aircraft engine factory site in Genshagen.
After 1945, the Soviet occupying forces had the machinery of the plant in the south of Berlin dismantled and had most of the factory halls blown up. Small businesses and repair workshops had set up shop in the remaining buildings.
This location was ideal for building a diesel engine plant for the expansion of the shipbuilding industry called for in the first five-year plan. The idea was to build a factory in which 2,000 employees would build engines on assembly lines in a double shift system. In addition to the positive effects on the regional economy, it was hoped that this would win back those skilled workers from Daimler-Benz who worked as cross-border commuters in the group's Marienfelder plant in West Berlin and who contributed to discontent among the population with their West German mark earnings. (28)
The decision to build the plant was made in 1951 in connection with the expansion plans. After consultations with representatives of WB Energie- und Kraftmaschinenbau in the VEB Elbe-Werk Roßlau and a site visit in Genshagen, a preliminary project for the "Special Investment Project Project M" from the Magdeburg Design Office I I was already available in February 1952. (29)
It consisted of three parts:
(I) Industrial buildings in Ludwigsfelde (Genshagen was no longer used as a place name)
(II) Expansion of the construction and model building potential in Roßlau
(III) Housing and social buildings in Ludwigsfelde.
The costs for 11 halls, administration and commercial buildings were estimated at 61.340 million marks in the first expansion phase, and 35.9 million marks were set aside for machinery and tool equipment. A further 8.9 million marks were needed for the energy supply and for irrigation and drainage. 19 million marks had to be raised for 800 company apartments and the associated social housing. A total of 130 million marks had to be invested in engine production in Ludwigsfelde. 80% of the products were to be marketable, only 20% were intended as "single-purpose machines" for military use. (30) (Fig. 21)
Fig. 21. The VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde (IWL) around 1957/58. (Source: Peter Riehmann Collection)
As required by law for large-scale construction projects, a special representative of the GDR government was appointed as head of the construction management. (31) Fritz Röbsteck was entrusted with this task. The engineer Huldreich Stroh was appointed deputy, acting plant manager and head of the main technology department. Helmut Bach took over commercial management. The construction staff had a total of 89 posts, of which 40 had already been filled by mid-March 1952.
The Minister for Mechanical Engineering, Gerhart Ziller, established the VEB Industriewerk Ludwigsfelde as a company directly subordinate to the Head Office for Heavy Machinery Construction with effect from March 1, 1952. (32)
The construction plans had ambitious goals: the shell of the factory halls was to be completed by December 31, 1952. Production was scheduled to start on August 1, 1953. These goals were pursued with great enthusiasm. An inspection by the German Investment Bank in July 1952 recorded construction work valued at 5.6 million marks and the employment of 2,822 construction workers. (33)
Ultimately, more than 3,500 craftsmen and fitters from three state-owned construction companies and VVB Stahlbau were employed on the factory premises, were able to celebrate the topping-out ceremony for five halls by October 1952 and hand over the partially equipped hall 11 for equipment construction on December 20, 1952. Preparations for the start of production began with the manufacture of devices and tools in January 1953.
Reorganisations in the management of the GDR's economy led to the VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde (IWL) being placed under the control of the Main Administration for Shipbuilding in the Ministry of Transport and Agricultural Machinery on 1 March 1953 and becoming legally independent through its entry in the commercial register on 1 July 1953.(34)
The consequences of June 17, 1953 hit the Ludwigsfelde plant hard. Secretary of State Wolf ordered a temporary halt to the expansion and the cancellation of around 28 million marks in investment funds for 1953. The VEB Projektierung Fahrzeugbau in East Berlin prescribed a concept that permitted no further activities other than winterizing the shell structures and partially completing advanced construction phases. The German Investment Bank saw the "new situation" as only an opportunity to contribute to the partial financing of the operation. In addition to securing the building structure and preserving the machines that had already been installed, funds were to be made available for unpaid bills and outstanding payment obligations, a total of 7.8 million DM. (35)
The "New Course" propagated by the SED leadership drastically reduced armament projects in the GDR and called into question the contract for the Ludwigsfelde plant. For the production of the 20 KVD 25, this change in policy meant the loss of at least one year in production preparation, with fatal consequences for the entire speedboat construction program.
Of course, there was also blame for this dilemma and a hunt for scapegoats. Minister Gerhart Ziller lost his job, as did the head of the HV Schiffbau, Wilhelm Zieseniss.
Heinrich Rau handed over the leadership of the State Planning Commission to Bruno Leuschner and, by a decision of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, was made a kind of "super minister" responsible for the entire mechanical engineering sector in the GDR.
A control committee was set up for the Ludwigsfelde industrial plant, which included plant manager Vester, the company's party secretary, the commercial director of HV Schiffbau, and a representative of the Potsdam branch of the German Investment Bank.
The committee came to the conclusion that, as part of the program to promote heavy machine construction adopted in 1952, the then Minister Ziller had approved "unplanned investments" without an approved preliminary project and without a legal basis, which in the case of Ludwigsfelde, including start-up costs, had burdened the GDR economy with 52.5 million marks.
Of the 64.6 million marks earmarked for 1953 for the expansion of the IWL and the 11 million marks for housing and social housing, 40 million were to be cut.
The report of the Central Commission for State Control in April 1954 criticized the fact that the IWL factory management had not been staffed by "a strong collective," and the German Investment Bank was criticized for having carried out the in-depth examination that had often been requested in the past too late. (36)
At the end of 1953, plant manager Heinrich Vester was replaced by Hans Singhuber. (Fig. 22) Singhuber had served under Heinrich Rau in the Spanish Civil War. He headed the VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde until November 1959. During his term of office at the end of 1955, the plant was placed under the control of the new armaments authority, the Office for Technology (AfT), headed by State Secretary Wolf.
Fig. 22. Factory director Hans Singhuber (Source: Peter Riehmann Collection)
In the second phase of rearmament in the GDR, which began in 1954/55, the Ludwigsfelde company got its old contract back. As the main cooperation partner of the KEB Roßlau, it was to prepare the series production of high-performance diesel engines. The relocation of the scientific and technical staff and the test benches from Roßlau was prepared and an office building was commissioned for the newly created Institute for Engine Construction. (Fig. 23)
Fig. 23. Rear view of the former Institute for Engine Construction (IfM) in Ludwigsfelde. (Photo: Peter Riehmann, August 2002)
Before these concentration plans could be realized, the SED leadership had already decided differently: In the course of building up the aviation industry, the VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde was designated as plant 807 in the GDR's aircraft industry for the production of jet engines of the type Pirna 0 14 from 1 January 1957.(37)
After aircraft production in the GDR was also stopped in 1961, the Navy at least benefited from the modified Pirna 0 14 jet engines, which could be used as gas generators to power 12 submarine hunters of Project 12.4 "Hai". (38)
For the sake of completeness, it should be added that after the Pirna 0 14 production was discontinued, the repair of aircraft engines for the GDR Air Force provided employment. The responsible operating department II became part of the Dresden aircraft factory in 1965 and finally became part of the VEB Kombinat Spezialtechnik as a VEB repair shop in 1971.(39)
After a failed attempt to include it in the production of machine tools, the main plant was taken over by VVB Energie- und Kraftmaschinenbau, but in 1963 it switched back to VVB Automobilbau and finally found a permanent place in the GDR economy with the production of the W 50 truck.
The complicated development of the two companies in the post-reunification period cannot be discussed here.
3.4. Suppliers
High-performance engines of the MB 511/20 KVD 25 type cannot be produced without subcontracting to selected suppliers.
As with Daimler-Benz, the GDR was dependent on handing over important parts of production to cooperating companies and also using research facilities of various kinds in order to catch up with the technological lead of the original as quickly as possible.
The large number of suppliers involved can no longer be recorded. Therefore, only companies and facilities that have been recorded are mentioned. (40)
For the problem crankshaft component, the VEB Stahlwerk Gröditz supplied the forgings, in the processing of which the Magdeburg heavy machinery companies "Ernst Thälmann Werk" and "Karl Liebknecht Werk" as well as the VEB Bergmann-Borsig in East Berlin and the VEB Schwermaschinenbau "Heinrich Rau" in Wildau were involved with varying degrees of success. Special machines for machining the crankshaft were acquired with the help of the VEB Werkzeugmaschinen (WEMA) Plauen and the VEB Schleifmaschinenwerk Leipzig. The basic bearings came from the Deutsche Kugellager-Fabrik (DKF) Leipzig.
The castings, especially the crankcase upper and lower sections as large castings with a deadline, were awarded by the BfW to the VEB Metallgußwerk Leipzig with a research contract and the option of series production. This company had carried out similar orders for the aviation industry up until 1945, so the prerequisites were in place in terms of space and partly in terms of personnel. It remains incomprehensible why the producer of this workpiece in World War II, the VEB Metallgußwerk in Wemigerode, was not commissioned to do this straight away. When this happened under the direction of the AfT and under the influence of the aviation industry at the end of 1958, it came too late for the 20 KVD 25 program.
The drop forging work for the main and auxiliary connecting rods was awarded to the VEB Heavy Machinery Construction "Heinrich Rau" in Wildau, also with considerable start-up difficulties.
The contract for the manufacture of the gears went to the VEB Maschinen- und Zahnräderfabrik Gotha, which worked together with the VEB Industriewerk Karl-Marx-Stadt and the VEB Waggonbau Ammendorf.
The order to produce 300 gearboxes for the 20 KVD 25 gave the factory management in Gotha a welcome opportunity to request investment funds from the BfW for the expansion of the company and the modernization of the machine park. According to a list dated November 27, 1952, the 685,000 DM for the replacement of already planned capacities would also have had to be paid from the Ministry of the Interior's budget. However, the application from Gotha confirms that with the planned production of 50 gearboxes in 1953, 100 in 1954 and 150 in the following year, the planned figures specified in the "Zeuthen" document for the 20 KVD 25 (273 engines) would have been achieved. (Appendix 3, page 58)
The VEB Elektrochemisches Kombinat Bitterfeld was involved in the casting and extrusion of the starting material for piston production. Further processing took place at the IWL and at the VEB Kabelwerke Oberspree in East Berlin.
Piston pins were ordered from the VEB IFA Motorenwerk Karl-Marx-Stadt. Nitriding took place in Magdeburg.
The charger was a product of the VEB Kompressorenbau Bannewitz, the fuel pumps came from the VEB Reichenberger Naben- und Kupplungswerk and the block injection pumps from the VEB Elbe-Werk Roßlau, branch plant Aken.
The Central Institutes for Foundry Technology in Leipzig and for Welding Technology in Halle as well as the Institutes for Rail Vehicles, for Chipless Plastic Forming in Zwickau, for Bearing Technology in Leipzig and the Iron Research Institute in Henningsdorf were involved in the development and reproduction of the most important engine parts. The Scientific-Technical Office for Power Machines (WTB/K) in Berlin-Adlershof was involved in the development of measuring and testing technology, in equipping the test benches and took on a research contract for the development of a remote control for the engines of the "Forelle".
In particularly urgent cases, spare parts could be obtained for cash in West German marks from the "Central Office for Research Requirements" in East Berlin, Unter den Linden.
The engine oils from GDR supplies that were available for the first tests in 1955/56 revealed their performance limits after analysis of the first faults. They were unsuitable for the operation of high-performance diesel engines. Therefore, in order to prevent engine damage, the VEB Mineralölwerk Lützkendorf and the VEB Chemische Werke Buna as well as other research institutes had to be involved in the development of special oils. With the "Buna export oil alloyed", a lubricant was finally developed that was similar to western products and the lack of which had led to considerable problems during engine testing.
4. The 20 KVD 25 as a built-on engine, in production and testing
4.1. The unsuccessful start - production preparations 1952 -1954
As reported in chapters 3.1 and 3.2, the initial plans for the MB 511 replica envisaged that research and development work as well as prototype construction should take place in Roßlau
until the construction of the Ludwigsfelde plant made it possible to concentrate the entire project at this location. (41)
In this context, the head of the main administration for heavy machinery construction in the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering, Ernst Wolf, met with representatives of the Office for Economic Affairs on October 18, 1951 to discuss the engine project. The project was then included in the ministry's plans and was part of the maritime police's armament projects from November 6, 1951. (42)
At the beginning of 1952, Willi Stoph asked the chief designer of the KEB Roßlau, Kurt Böhme, to report on the technical details of the planned engine construction. Böhme must not have seen any insurmountable difficulties in this order, assuming the possibility of making full use of the engine technology expertise gathered in Roßlau and massive state support. (43)
The KEB Roßlau and the VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde were provided with 5 original engines (some sources also mention 6). Three of these were of the MB 511 model and two of the MB 501 type.
No reliable source could be found for the origin of the engines. The Mdl and the Central Office for Technology (forerunner of the State Secretariat for Science and Technology) are mentioned, but also an illegal purchase of used engines from the West for the first two deliveries. Others were delivered in boxes painted military green, presumably from the Soviet Union. (44)
The poor condition of the used machines suggests that they were salvaged from wrecks or removed from poorly maintained captured ships. The first original engine with the serial number 511064 arrived in Roßlau on the night of September 24th to 25th, 1952, six months late. It was hidden in a furniture van for camouflage purposes. (45)
This engine was in a desolate and incomplete condition. The cylinder liners, crankshaft and roller bearings were heavily rusted, the camshafts and injection pumps were damaged, the starter device and the exhaust pipes, a total of 13 items, were completely missing. (46)
Similar experiences were made with the other original engines, some of which also showed damage from improper crane transport. (Fig. 24 and 25)
Fig. 24. MB 501 engine with serial number 649 delivered to KEB Roßlau in an incomplete state (Photo: WTZ Roßlau archive)
Fig. 25. Partial view of the engine type MB 501, serial no. 649. (Cylinder heads). (Photo: Archive WTZ Roßlau)
Böhme appointed a group of around 20 engineers and assistants, including young technical college graduates, to carry out the reconstruction. (Fig. 26). They were given separate work rooms, special company IDs and were sworn to secrecy. Their task was to divide the engine into components, determine dimensions and material (non-destructively) and, after inspection by a quality control officer, produce technical drawings for the replica.
The KEB did not have access to original documents, although it can be assumed that they were available from Soviet authorities or the BfW, because the "Stoph Apparatus" had acquired an extensive technical intelligence service.
Working groups were formed under the leadership of Deputy Chief Designer Schmerse, who after the war, as a Junkers engineer, had been one of the experts who had been involved in building up the Soviet aviation industry in Kuibyshev.
Schmerse himself headed the working group for the crankshaft, connecting rods and pistons. A Junkers expert was also available for the crankcase working group. Other working groups existed for the cylinder heads and valves, for pumps, pipes, charging fans and intercoolers, and for injection pumps. The quality controller and a clerk for ordering materials as well as technical support staff completed the team of experienced practitioners from the former Otto Mader plant of Junkers and junior staff.
The role of Soviet specialists from an unknown acceptance institution is not clear. One, occasionally two, stayed at the KEB Roßlau and performed control functions.
Production documents were only considered final when they were countersigned by a Soviet specialist.
Fig. 26. Employment contract of the engineer Wolfgang Förster with the KEB Roßlau from May 52. (Source: private property)
When demonstrators entered the premises of the KEB Roßlau during the unrest on June 17, 1953, the Soviet citizen who was present that day had to be taken to safety in Dessau in the chief designer's official car. (47)
The deadline for completion of the technical documentation was set for December 21st, the birthday of the Soviet party and head of state Stalin, who had died in the spring. Unusually high bonuses were awarded for the early completion of this task, which cost around 0.5 million marks.
The research and development plan of the VP-See envisaged the use of 9.55 million marks for the 20 KVD 25 in 1953/54. (48) This was intended to enable the gradual conversion of the original engine to the new GDR model. It was also considered to achieve an increase in performance through higher turbocharging. (49) The view that the series engine could be produced at a lower price than Daimler-Benz was quite optimistic. (50)
A two-cylinder test engine was built and a Daimler-Benz MB 846 AB engine and a 1 NVD 14 engine were purchased for comparative test runs.
The original engine with the serial number 190770 of type 501 was the first engine to arrive in Roßlau for testing after being overhauled at the IWL on September 3, 1953. A charger was delivered on November 5, and the engine was then operated as MB 511. A test run on November 23 was observed by representatives of the Wolgast Institute for Shipbuilding Technology, the Roßlau shipyard and VEB IWL, as well as Captain Wachsmann from the VP-See staff. From 1954, original and built-on engines ran on the test benches in Roßlau and from autumn 1955 on the "Forelle 0" in alternating test series.
While the manual repair work was relatively easy to complete, difficulties arose during the reconstruction due to a lack of experience in materials and production technology. In addition, there were different opinions at the VP-See, the BfW and the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering about the number of engines to be produced, delivery dates and cooperation with the partner responsible for shipbuilding. In particular, the VP-See was unable to ensure a consistently high level of urgency for the 20 KVD 25 program.
If one assumes that the VP-See's plans in 1952 included the construction of a series of 24 TS boats of the "Forelle" type, then the demands of the head of the BfW's special department for warship construction, chief engineer Werner Klewitz, make sense: On October 28, 1952, the influential representative of the Office for Economic Affairs informed the management of VEB IWL through his agency's planning and contracting administration that a cost estimate had to be submitted for the 1953 "intended" government contract no. B3/IV/030 for the delivery of 50 20 KVD 25 engines. (51)
During a further consultation with Klewitz on March 18, 1953, the management of VEB IWL learned that the order for the 20 KVD 25 and the delivery of spare parts for the Jumo 205 C and D of the VP-See, valued at 4.113 million marks, were to be treated equally.
For 1953, the delivery of three repair engines and three new engines was required. The target of 50 engines was therefore off the table and the "disaster report" from the plant's material supply department was to be presented to the head of the central material supply in the government, Klopfer. There was agreement that the production preparations at VEB IWL needed to receive greater support from the ministry. (52)
On April 25, 1953, Hall 8 in Ludwigsfelde (Fig. 27) was designated for the majority production of the 20 KVD 25 and on this occasion it was criticized that there was no match between main and workshop technology. (53)
Fig. 27. Hall 8 of VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde (IWL) (Photo: Peter Riehmann, August 2002)
On May 13, 1953, Klewitz reduced his order for 1954 to 36 engines in front of the commercial management of VEB IWL and also announced that his plans included a need for 130 engines 20 KVD 25 by 1956. (54) The BfW was to provide three million marks via the HV Schiffbau for the start of parts production.
According to the so-called "Plan M", the plant had expected 50 engine orders for 1953, 100 for 1954 and even 150 for 1955 and had prepared itself accordingly in terms of capacity planning and material ordering.
Confronted with confusing plan figures and in danger of getting into trouble due to hoarding excess material stocks, this problem was brought to the attention of the head of the HV Schiffbau, Zieseniss, on May 28, 1953. (55)
Before a decision could be made in the Shipbuilding Committee, the events of June 17, 1953 created new conditions. On June 19, 1953, State Secretary Wolf ordered: "1. Work on the 20 KVD 25 engine must be stopped and all contracts concluded with subcontractors must be cancelled. Only one prototype machine will be built this year, with development and construction planned to be carried out in Roßlau. 2. The order for a general overhaul of the four machines in your factory remains valid. Likewise the order for the production of Jumo spare parts." (56)
Plant manager Vester and KEB boss Böhme then agreed on the future distribution of tasks on June 20, 1953.
The prototype machine was to be built in Ludwigsfelde with the "support" of the KEB Roßlau and tested in Roßlau. The repair of the MB original engines continued only with reduced effort. The production manager of the plant had ordered that the "engines in Ludwigsfelde should only be repaired to the extent that the existing parts allow. No new purchases will be made." (57)
As a result, the orders from the suppliers were cancelled on June 26, 1953.
After the proclamation of the "New Course" of the SED, there was great uncertainty among the development team. Kurt Böhme strictly refused to talk to the management of the VEB Metallgußwerk Leipzig about a tacit continuation of the development work on the casting technology for the lower housing section, because he did not know "which engine or what at all should be developed." He had not received any final instructions from the ministry. (58)
5. Summary
Only a few years after the end of World War II, the occupying powers in East and West believed they had good arguments for rearming their newly defeated Germans and including them in the new military alliances.
The armed forces of both German states included naval contingents. Admiral Dr. Sigurd Hess dated the beginning of naval armament in the Federal Republic after the war to March 1951.(100) In the GDR it began on the orders of the occupying power in 1948, was specified in 1949 and was part of the annual economic planning from 1951.
The GDR's fleet creation plans, such as those set out in the "Zeuthen" document, could not be realized with the country's economic performance in the 1950s. Therefore, extensive preparations were canceled in 1958 and from then on the military technology was imported from the Soviet Union.
One of the projects that was to be realized between 1952 and 1959 for the later People's Navy of the NVA under its own power was the torpedo speedboat of the "Forelle" type. It was powered by a replica of the Daimler-Benz MB 511 high-performance diesel engine with an output of 2500 hp were planned. The Soviet Navy also showed lively interest in this engine, which only waned when its own models were developed in Leningrad, of which radial in-line engines with 56 cylinders that ultimately developed 5400 hp.
In any case, those responsible in the GDR were convinced at the end of 1951 that the 20 KVD 25 program could also be implemented as part of the expansion of heavy industry.
The starting point for this was extremely bad. The country suffered from the consequences of war and the disproportions of the division of the German economic area. A total restructuring of the economy and society had been initiated, the management of which was associated with risks that were difficult to control.
Funds were made available from the “Special Fund Ludwigsfelde” to expand the workshops and assembly halls and to modernize the machine tool park. The most urgent task was to build test benches. The design and development office was to be expanded in terms of personnel and temporarily occupied rooms in the Karl-Liebknecht -Street 38 until expansion buildings in the Elbe factory would allow accommodation. The move to this temporary facility cost around half a million marks.
For the construction work, equipment, assembly and transport costs as well as other expenses, 7.8 million marks were approved from funds for the upgrade, of which around 4.9 million marks had been used by mid-November 1952.
Despite the high priority that the 20 KVD 25 program apparently enjoyed in economic planning, the statement from the Elbe-Werke investment group shows that the project experienced “weeks of delays” because there was a lack of transport, construction workers and ironmongers Despite speaking to the Ministry and the State Secretariat for Material Supply, no "password" for preferential treatment could be obtained. It was also not possible to obtain an “urgent number” for the machines, tools and other equipment.
The construction of special machines, e.g. for the plate boring machine for machining large engine housings made of aluminum alloy, was delayed by half a year because the "sample engine was delivered six months later than originally planned." Ultimately, the test bench was not put into operation on time because the the necessary pipelines could not be obtained.
In mid-October 1952, VEB Elbe-Werk's contract to become a development and prototype company for the 20 KVD 25 was withdrawn. Management was not provided with a reason for this decision. With the newly gained capacity, the company was to return to the production of diesel engines, piston steam engines, pumps and electric generators and these products would determine the "P 1 production", while the construction of five diesel engines 20 KVD 25 worth 4.5 million Mark should make up the “P 2 production”.
6. Sources
6.1. Unprinted
Federal Archives / Military Interim Archive Potsdam (BA/MZAP)
Police Forces (Pt) No. 884, 885/1, 2005, 3147, 4067, 4068, 4509, 5350, 5525/19, File I/41 16498 (Instructions of the Minister of the Interior) and 16522 (Decisions of the Council of Ministers) File 1/ 41, processing plans and reports from foreign provinces, finding aid from the Office for Technology, VVB UNIMAK and engineering-technical foreign trade (AfT, UNIMAK, ITA) AfT No. 0004, 006/1, 0007, 0014, 0015, 0017, 0017/1, 0018, 0018 /1, 0024, 0024/1 UNIMAK No. • 0001, 0003, 0004, 0010, 0107, 0110 ITA No. 0087. This inventory is now in the Federal Archives/Military Archives Freiburg/Breisgau
Brandenburg State Main Archive Potsdam-Bornim (BLHA). Rep. 506, VEB IFA Automobilwerk Ludwigsfelde, parent company of the VEB IFA Combined Commercial Vehicles (BLHA Rep 506, IF A Autowerk) BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 45/2, 72, 117, 123, 124, 193, 350, 359 , 361, 363, 364, 372,378,506, 1518, 1538, 1671, 1709, 1725.
Footnotes
1. - Fock, Harald, Speedboats - Development and Use in World War II, Volume 2, Herford 1974, pp. 78, 88, 98 and 99. Möller, Eberhard and Brack, Werner, One hundred years of diesel engines for five German navies with a section on diesel-powered ships with Voith-Schneider propellers, Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn, 1999, pp. 38-44.
2. - According to the building description of the KEB Roßlau in the copies from 1954/57 and 1959. The building description is attached as appendix no.l and excerpts from the preliminary operating instructions as appendix no. 2. In this article, the authors use the measurement system that was valid until 1960 . 20 KVD 25 stands for 20 cylinders, K = short stroke, V = four-stroke, D = diesel and 25 = 250 mm piston stroke. In the VP-See documents and in company correspondence the designations KVD 25, D 2500 and 20 KVD 25 M are also used for it .
3. - Dr. Hans Reinecke im Interview am 24. Juni 2001
4. - BLHA Rep. 506, I F A Autowerk Nr . 359, Production management, planning documents 1955-56. Spare parts deliveries for the 20 KVD 25 provided for 20 sets for the small coastal route and 4 sets for the long coastal route. IfM, final report 20 K V D 25 M, section 6.25 dated June 18, 1959, submitted by the head of design Sperber and the responsible clerk Gottstein, sheet 47, reserve and spare parts for the small and long coastal route. This includes the operational zone for the long coastal route up to 61 degrees north.
5. - Identification sheet for object Forelle of the Office of Technology, undated, probably 1956.
6. - Ingenieur Fritz Krage in Interview at 10. März 2000 in Ludwigsfelde
7. - Ulbricht speech of July 9, 1952, in: Military and Security Policy of the SED 1945 - 1988, Documents and Materials, Military Publishing House of the GDR 1989, Doc. 64 and 67.
8. - Staritz, Dietrich, The SED, Stalin and the "building of socialism" in the GDR. From the files of the party archives, in: Deutschland Archiv, 24th year 1991, pp. 686-700. Diedrich, Torsten, Preparations for and financing of rearmament in the SBZ/GDR in the years 1948 to 1953 and their repercussions on the economy, in: Thoß, Bruno (ed.) Creating a people's army - without shouting! Studies on the beginnings of a "covert rearmament" in the SBZ/GDR 1947 - 1952. Contributions to military history, volume 51. Published on behalf of the Military History Research Office by Bruno Thoß, Munich 1994, pp. 315 - 316.
9. - Diedrich, Torsten / Wenzke, Rüdiger, The Camouflaged Army, History of the Barracked People’s Police of the GDR 1952 - 1956, Published by the Military History Research Office, Berlin 2001, p. 679.
10. - Schreckenbach-Papiere, Befehl 086, Abschrift vom 8.Juni 1949. Für die Durchführung des Befehls übernahm der Präsident der Verwaltung des Innern (VDI) Wagner die Federführung.
11. - BA/MZAP Pt 5350, Plan der Maßnahmen für die Durchfuhrung des Marine-Bauprogramms 1954-56
12. - BA/MZAP Pt 5350, Plan der Maßnahmen für die Durchführung des Marine-Bauprogramms 1954-56, Blatt 10, 22/23, 87. Auerbach, Horst, Auf Kurs zur Marine, Schriftenreihe des Marinemuseums Dänholm, Heft 6 / 1998, Stralsund 1998.
13. - Verantwortliche Minister, mit verschiedenen Titeln, waren Gerhard Ziller (1950 - Januar 1954), Heinrich Rau (1954/55) Erich Apel (1955/58). Ziller und Apel begingen Selbstmord. Die wechselnde Unterstellung und Leitung der Schiffbauindustrie der DDR ist am besten beschrieben in: Dietrich Strobel / Günter Dame, Schiffbau zwischen Elbe und Oder, Herford 1993, S. 110. Ferner: Namen und Daten wichtiger Personen der DDR , Berlin-Bonn 1987.
14. - Inspekteur/Chefinspekteur/Konteradmiral Scheffler gehörte zu den Gründungsvätem der Seepolizei. E r gab die Leitung Mitte 1950 an Generalinspekteur/Vizeadmiral Waldemar Verner ab und übernahm während dessen Fortbildung in der Sowjetunion von 1955 bis 1956 wieder das Kommando. Er überführte die VP-See in die NV A. Die Schiffbauabteilung wurde von 1950 bis 1951 von Kommandeur (Fregattenkapitän) Friedrich geleitet, danach von Kapitän z. See (Ing.) Wachsmann bis 1957. Ab 1958 war Kapitän z. See Dr. Müller Vorgesetzter des Leiters der Schiffbauabteilung, Kapitän z. See Karl Nitzsche. Kapitänleutnant (Ing.) Fritz Blücher leitete die U A Baukontrolle. Major Paul Fink floh Ostern 1956 mit seiner Familie nach Westdeutschland.
15. - TorstenDiedrich/RüdigerWenzke,DiegetarnteArmee,S.366,
16. - BA/MZAP Pt 884, Blatt 34, Büro für Wirtschaftsfragen, Der Leiter, Schreiben vom 16.August 1951 (Abschrift)
17. - Gall, Ulrich, Generalleutnant, Diplom-Ökonom, Chef für Beschaffung und Instandsetzung beim Stellvertreter des Ministers für Technik und Bewaffnung, Dreiunddreißig Jahre zentrale Realisierung des materiell-technischen Bedarfs der NVA. Entwicklung und Ergebnisse, Prozesse und Probleme, Versuch eines Rückblicks. Unredigierter Entwurf, Berlin 1990. Ökonomie und Landesverteidigung, Militärverlag der D D R , Berlin 1974. Becker/Einhorn/Fiedler/Schönherr, Ökonomie und Landesverteidigung, 3. Auflage, Dietz Verlag Berlin 1987. Stichwort „ökonomische Sicherstellung der Landesverteidigung" im Militärlexikon der D D R , Deutscher Militärverlag Berlin 1971, S.287/288.
18. - BA/MZAP Akte 1/41, Bearbeitungspläne und Bericht fremder Provinienzen, Findbuch AfT, UNIMAK, ITA. Anweisung des Stellvertretenden Vorsitzenden des Ministerrats, Willi Stoph, Nr. 20/55 vom 30.September 1955, Akte 16498.
19. - Interview mit Professor Dr. Horst Nolle am 8. Juli 1993.
20. - BA/MZAP Akte 16522, Beschluß des Präsidiums des Ministerrats zur Auflösung des AfT vom 13. Februar 1958. Hauptdirektoren der W B UNIMAK waren von 1958 bis 1960 Oberst Bernhard Koppatsch, von 1960 bis 1961 Genraimajor Hermann Rentzscb. Das Statut der W B UNIMAK in den Mitteilungen der W B Nr. 1/1958 vom 1. Juli 1958.
21. - Hans Mehl/Knut Schäfer, Die andere deutsche Marine, Berlin 1992, S. 55. Zeittafel zur Militärgeschichte der DDR 1949 - 1984, Berlin (Ost) 1986, S. 100.
22. - Koschig, Alois, 50 Jahre Motorenforschung in Roßlau, in: Zerbster Heimatkalender 2000 , Verlag für Heimatliteratur, Zerbst 2000, S. 120 - 126 . Naimark , Norman M., Die Russen in Deutschland. Die sowjetische Besatzungszone 1945 - 1949, Berlin 1997, S. 277 - 287 . Mewes, Klaus - Hermann, Pirna 014 , Flugtriebwerke der DDR, Ii Auflage, Oberhaching 1997, S. 29 . Mewes beschreibt die Verteilung der Rückkehrer in den V E B Elbewerk Roßlau, das WTZ für Dieselmotoren Roßlau und in den VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde.
23. - Schreckenbach-Papiere, Fo 2, Interview mit Kurt Böhme im Mai 1989, BA/MZAP Pt 2005, Kaderbefehle, Befehl Nr. 45/55 betr. Die Verleihung der Medaille der KVP an Böhme. Strobel, Dietrich, Das Institut für Schiffbautechnik Wolgast, in : Zur Geschichte der Rüstungsindustrie in Mecklenburg und Vorpommern 1900 bis 1989, Schwerin 2000, S. 134. Naimark, Norman M., Die Russen in Deutschland. Ferner:Die SBZ von 1945 bis 1949, Berlin 1997, S. 289.
24. - WTZ Roßlau gGmbH, 1950 - 2000, innovation based on tradition, 50 years of industrial research in Roßlau. Reprint of the WTZ, Roßlau 2000. Koschig, Alois, 50 years of engine research in Roßlau. In: Zerbster Heimatkalender 2000, 41st year, Verlag für Heimatliteratur Zerbst 2000, pp. 120 - 126. Sperber, Rudolf, From the group design office to the scientific and technical center. In: Diesel engine news from VEB Schwermaschinenbau “Karl Liebknecht, Magdeburg, issue 2/1975. The same, 15 years of WTZ Diesel engines, lecture on the 15th anniversary of WTZ Diesel engines, held on October 22nd, 1965 in Dessau, special print. Id. (Ed.) Technical handbook for diesel engines, 4th edition, Berlin (East) 1986.
25. - BLHA Rep 506, IF A Autowerk No. 1725, report from the factory management of the VEB Elbe-Werk Roßlau from November 13th, 1952, 21 pages and a site plan. Unless otherwise stated, all information in this section refers to this report.
26. - P 1 production means production of products from one's own material for one's own account, P 2 production means production for the account of others. Source: Lexikon der Wirtschaft-Industrie, Berlin (East) 1970, p. 615/616
27. - The description of this by Möller/Brack, 100 Years of Diesel Engines, p. 102, is not accurate.
28. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 1538, correspondence with the Central Committee in 1952, including the draft letter, undated.
29. - "Special projects" were the subtle description of armament projects.
30. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 123, first draft for the expansion of the company, preliminary project from February 28, 1952.
31. - The order for the 1952 national economic plan for investments and general repairs of February 10, 1952 is printed on pages 137 - 143 in the GDR Law Gazette No. 24 of February 20, 1952. Heinrich Rau issued it in his capacity as chairman of the State Planning Commission. Section VI, paragraphs b) and c) define the tasks of the special representatives and construction management.
32. - BLHA Rep.506, IFA Works No. 1625, I WL Construction Management, correspondence with the ministries 1952, Ministry of Mechanical Engineering, Journal No. 486/52, copy. The founding document is lost. On July 9, 1952, Röbsteck reported to the minister that the main repair plant in Ludwigsfelde had been taken over by the Ministry of Economics and Labor of the State of Brandenburg. The later common name VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde is probably related to this.
33. - BLHA Rep. 5Ö6, IF A Autowerk No. 117, Rules of Procedure of the VEB IWL Construction Management and No. 123, First draft for the construction of the company in 1952, report from July 2, 1952.
34. - Bober, Rudolf, Information on the VEB IFA automobile factory Ludwigsfelde, parent company of the VEB IFA combine for commercial vehicles 1952 - 1996, Ludwigsfelde city archives.
35. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk Nr. 1671, Prüfbericht des VEB Projektierung Fahrzeugbau Berlin zur Teilstruktur des IWL 1953 vom 1.7.1953.36. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 124, Minutes - Memos on Personnel Matters 1953, Report of the Control Committee.
36. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 124, Minutes - Memos on Personnel Matters 1953, Report of the Control Committee.
37. - Franke, Werner/Michels, Jürgen, VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde (Plant 807) in: Michelsjürgen / Werner, Jochen, Aviation East 1945 - 1990, Bonn 1994. Mewes, Klaus-Hermann, Pirna 014, Aircraft engines in the GDR, Oberhaching 1997, pp. 70 -73, including a plant plan on page 146.
38. - Mewes, Klaus-Hennann, A somewhat exotic ship propulsion system, Schiffahrt International, Issue 9 (September) 1998, pp. 27-28.
39. - Riehmann, Peter, The history of jet engine construction for aviation in Ludwigsfelde after 1945. Ludwigsfelde City Archives.
40. - In particular: Archive of the WTZ Roßlau, holding 20 KVD 25, Ludwigsfelde city archive, holding VEB Industriewerke Ludwigsfelde and Brandenburg State Main Archive, Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 193, 350, 361,372, 378, 1518 and 1725.
41. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 1725, plans KEB Roßlau 1952/53, project KVD 25 from April 9, 1952
42. - BA/MZAP, Pt 885/1, sheet 171, Wolf's consultation with the head of planning at the BfW, Bernhard Koppatsch. Schrechenbach papers Fo 1: The employee Schwarz from the BfW initiated the engine replica on November 6, 1951.
43. - Schrechenbach Papers Fo 2. Lieutenant Colonel Winkelmann and Friedrich Reddöhl from the BfW took part in the meeting.
44. - Schreckenbach Papers Fo 3. Report by Manfred Sydow on 12.9.2001 and assumption by Dipl.-Ing.Horst von Duisburg, Wolgast.
45. - Interview with Wolfgang Förster in Ludwigsfelde at 10.3.2000
46. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 1518, Commercial Management 1953, Technology 1953, report for the Commercial Director dated November 17, 1953, strictly confidential. Archive WTZ Roßlau, final report 4-324.904-1/58, Annexes I and H dated November 23, 1953
47. - Interview with Wolfgang Förster on March 10, 2000
48. - BA/MZAP, Pt 5525/19, R&D plan 1953-55
49. - BA/MZAP, AfT/0024, page 75
50. - Fritz Krage in an interview on March 10, 2000. According to this, the aim was to undercut the DB price by 100,000 DM.
51. - BLHA Rep. 506, IFA Autowerk No. 72, start of production 1953, BfW - Administration for Contract Manufacturing, October 28, 195
52. - BLHA Rep.506, IFA Autowerk No. 193, Labor Department, minutes of meetings 1952-55. Consultation of the factory management with Obering. Klewitz on March 18, 1953.
53. - EBDA., working meeting of 25.4.53 in the minutes of 16.5.53
54. - BLHA Rep.506, IFA Autowerk No. 72, production start in 1953, consultation between Klewitz and the commercial director Bach on 13.5.53
55. - EBDA., meeting of the purchasing director with the head of the shipbuilding committee on 28.5.53, transcript, confidential
56. -
100. - In March 1951, the S-Boat 208 of the former Kriegsmarine, which sailed under the British flag with a German crew, was overhauled at the Lürssen shipyard and the Daimler-Benz MB 501 engines were replaced. In: Hess, Sigurd, The "British Baltic Fishery Protection Service" and the "Schnellbootgruppe Klose" 1949 - 1956. German Society for Shipping and Naval History e.V., contributions to shipping history, edited by Hartmut Klüver, Volume 4, Düsseldorf 2001, p. 75 - 93 (Here: p. 81)